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I. INTRODUCTION
In Desgagnés Transport Inc. v. Wärtsilä Canada Inc.,1 the Supreme Court of
Canada addressed the relationship between non-statutory law and federalism in the
context of Canadian maritime law. The dispute turned on whether the Civil Code of
Québec2 or non-statutory federal maritime law governed a latent defect in engine
parts that a Dutch company and its Canadian division (“Wärtsilä”) had sold to a
Canadian shipping company located in Quebec (“TDI”). If federal maritime law
governed, Wärtsilä’s liability would be limited to 250,000. If Quebec civil law
governed, TDI would recover slightly more than $5.6 million.3 All nine justices
agreed that Quebec civil law governed the dispute.
The majority reasons were written by Gascon, Côté and Rowe JJ. (Moldaver,
Karakatsanis and Martin JJ. concurring). The majority found the matter, the sale of
marine engine parts intended for use on a commercial vessel, to have a double aspect
amenable to both federal and provincial regulation. As the CCQ provisions did not
impair the core of federal legislative authority over navigation and shipping, and
there was no federal statutory law that conﬂicted with the provincial law, the
provincial law was valid, applicable and operative.
Chief Justice Wagner and Brown J. (Abella J. concurring) provided minority
concurring reasons, ﬁnding that the matter, the sale of goods in the maritime context,
was in pith and substance one of property and civil rights and therefore within
exclusive provincial legislative authority and not federal authority over navigation
and shipping. Since the matter fell within exclusive provincial jurisdiction, there
was no need for the concurring justices to consider the doctrines of paramountcy or
interjurisdictional immunity.
The decision is a signiﬁcant precedent for both federalism and Canadian maritime
law jurisprudence. It frames a debate among the justices regarding the relationship
between the federal power over navigation and shipping in section 91(10) of the
Constitution Act, 18674 and the Federal Court of Canada’s jurisdiction over
maritime law as set out in section 22 of the Federal Courts Act,5 as well as the
1

[2019] S.C.J. No. 58, 2019 SCC 58 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wärtsilä”].

2

CQLR, c. CCQ-1991 [hereinafter “CCQ”].

3

See Wärtsilä, at para. 1.

4

(U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3.

5

R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7.

228

THE GROWING ACCEPTANCE OF PROVINCIAL JURISDICTION IN MARITIME MATTERS

relevance of the need for uniformity in maritime matters. The decision further
conﬁrms the trajectory of the Court’s restrained approach to interjurisdictional
immunity following its decision in Canadian Western Bank.6 It overtakes Ordon
Estate v. Grail7 and Bow Valley Husky,8 in which the applicability of federal
maritime law ousted the application of provincial laws. It continues the Court’s
pattern, post-Canadian Western Bank, of limiting the core of constitutional heads of
legislative authority protected by interjurisdictional immunity to matters already
established by precedent. It conﬁrms that this core must be impaired, not merely
affected, before the doctrine will render laws inapplicable. Finally, it conﬁrms that
the doctrine of paramountcy only applies to resolve conﬂicts between federal and
provincial statutory laws, and that non-statutory maritime law will not render valid
and applicable provincial laws inoperative.
II. THE DISPUTE
In October 2006, one of TDI’s ships, the Camilla, sustained damage to its
crankshaft and bedplate of its main engine while operating in Nunavut. TDI
purchased from Wärtsilä a new bedplate, a reconditioned crankshaft and connecting
rods. The contract of sale contained a six-month warranty, and thereafter limited
Wärtsilä’s liability to 250,000. TDI installed the new parts, and the Camilla returned
to service in February 2007.9
In October 2009, after the warranty had expired, the Camilla’s engine failed. TDI
sued Wärtsilä for damages and lost proﬁts, totalling more than $5.6 million. The trial
judge found that the crankshaft Wärtsilä had sold to TDI contained a latent defect,
and that under the CCQ Wärtsilä was presumed to be aware of this defect.10 This
factual ﬁnding was not disputed on appeal.11
Wärtsilä argued, at trial and on appeal, that the contractual limitation of liability
clause was valid because there was no statutory or non-statutory rule in Canadian
maritime law barring a seller from limiting its liability for latent defects. TDI
contended that the CCQ prevented Wärtsilä from limiting its liability for latent
6
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 41,
43, 50-51 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Canadian Western Bank”].
7

[1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437, at paras. 81, 85 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter
“Ordon”].
8

Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd., [1997] S.C.J. No.
111, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bow Valley Husky”].
9

See Wärtsilä, at paras. 110-112.

10

Transport Desgagnés inc. c. Wärtsilä Canada Inc., [2015] Q.J. No. 12923, 2015 QCCS
5514, at para. 6 (Que. S.C.) [hereinafter “Wärtsilä QCCS”].
11

See Wärtsilä, at para. 113.
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defects.12
III. THE JUDGMENTS
1.

Quebec Superior Court

The trial judge characterized the matter as “the sale of a marine engine”.13 In
order to determine whether the sale of a marine engine was related to Parliament’s
jurisdiction over navigation and shipping, she applied the following test:
Is the activity at stake so integrally connected to maritime matters such that it is
practically necessary for Parliament to have jurisdiction over same, in order to
properly exercise its legislative power over navigation and shipping?14

She concluded that obligations arising from a contract of sale “are not integrally
connected to the pith and substance of Parliament’s jurisdiction over navigation and
shipping”.15 Speciﬁcally, the sale of a marine engine was not integrally connected
to issues of safe carriage of goods over the sea, movement of goods on and off a
ship, seamanship or seaworthiness of a ship, admiralty law, or international maritime
conventions, and there was no need for uniformity of rules governing contracts of
sale in a maritime context.16 Consequently, she held that the CCQ provisions
governed the dispute.
Applying the CCQ was pivotal to the trial judge’s ultimate assessment of liability.
At common law, the onus is on the buyer to demonstrate that a latent defect affected
an essential characteristic of the product and that the seller either knew of the defect
at the time of sale or showed reckless disregard for what it should have known.17
Under the CCQ, however, the onus largely shifts to the seller through two
evidentiary presumptions: (1) any premature deterioration of a product is presumed
to arise from a latent defect; and (2) a professional seller is presumed to have known
about the latent defect at the time of the sale.18 The trial judge concluded that these
presumptions had not been rebutted and issued judgment in favour of the plaintiffs
for approximately $5.6 million.
12

See Wärtsilä, at para. 113; Civil Code of Québec, CQLR, c. CCQ-1991, arts. 1729,

1733.
13

See Wärtsilä QCCS, at para. 26.

14

See Wärtsilä QCCS, at para. 24 [underlining added by the court].

15

See Wärtsilä QCCS, at paras. 25, 27.

16

See Wärtsilä QCCS, at paras. 28-29; see also Wärtsilä, at para. 115.

17

See ABB Inc. v. Domtar Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 50, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 461, at para. 80
(S.C.C.); Wärtsilä Canada inc. c. Transport Desgagnés inc., [2017] J.Q. no 13424, 2017
QCCA 1471, at paras. 81-82 (Que. C.A.) [hereinafter “Wärtsilä QCCA”].
18
See Civil Code of Québec, CQLR, c. CCQ-1991, arts. 1728, 1729; Wärtsilä QCCS, at
paras. 36-46; ABB Inc. v. Domtar Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 50, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 461, at paras.
40-44 (S.C.C.).
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2.

Quebec Court of Appeal

A majority at the Quebec Court of Appeal reversed the trial judge and upheld the
limitation of the liability clause using common law principles. Justice Mainville,
writing for the majority, characterized the matter as “the repair and supply of engine
parts to a ship”.19 He concluded that this was intrinsically connected to a ship’s
seaworthiness and, therefore, “directly and integrally connected to navigation and
shipping”.20 He arrived at this conclusion based on sections 22(2)(m) and (n) of the
Federal Courts Act, which provide that disputes regarding materials supplied to a
ship for its operation or maintenance and contracts relating to the construction,
repair, or equipping of a ship come within the Federal Court’s concurrent
jurisdiction over Canadian maritime law.21
In dissent, Vézina J.A. agreed with the trial judge that the CCQ governed the
dispute. Justice Vézina also concluded, based on section 8.1 of the federal
Interpretation Act,22 that the contractual rights at issue must be adjudicated on the
basis of relevant provincial law concerning property and civil rights.23 Interestingly,
Vézina J.A.’s recourse to section 8.1 of the federal Interpretation Act impliedly
presupposes a double aspect, whereby the matter validly comes within both a federal
power and a provincial one.
3.

The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court overturned the Court of Appeal’s conclusion and reinstated
the trial judge’s damages award. All nine justices agreed that the CCQ governed the
dispute. The majority found that the matter validly came within both federal and
provincial jurisdiction. Their decision conﬁrms that, where a provincial statute
operates alongside federal non-statutory law to regulate a matter possessing a double
aspect, the provincial statute prevails. The concurring justices would have found the
matter to come exclusively within provincial jurisdiction.
(a) Pith and Substance
The majority set out the familiar two-step test in the “division of powers analysis”
for determining whether a “matter” comes within a federal power, provincial power,
or both. First, the court must characterize the relevant matter. Second, the court must
classify that matter according the heads of legislative power enumerated in the
Constitution Act, 1867.24 Relying on Canadian Western Bank, the majority
19

Wärtsilä QCCA, at para. 95.

20

Wärtsilä QCCA, at para. 95.

21

Wärtsilä QCCA, at paras. 89-93; Federal Courts Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-7, ss.
22(2)(m)-(n).
22

R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21.

23

Wärtsilä QCCA, at paras. 46-51.

24

Wärtsilä, at para. 3.
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described the characterization stage, also known as the “pith and substance test”, as
requiring courts to examine the “purpose and effects” of the speciﬁc provision
challenged in order to identify its “main thrust” or “dominant or most important
characteristic”, the “matter to which it essentially relates”.25
The ﬁrst major fault line between the majority and the concurrence occurs on
what exactly must be characterized in applying the pith and substance test. The
majority, looking to the “substantive body of law at issue” and to the particular fact
situation, concluded that the matter was “the sale of marine engine parts intended for
use on a commercial vessel”.26 The concurring justices, looking at the “subject
matter engaged by the claim”,27 determined the matter was “the sale of goods, albeit
in the maritime context”.28
For the majority, both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal essentially applied
the appropriate test — the “integral connection” test. This test asks whether the
subject matter identiﬁed at the characterization stage is integrally connected to the
exercise of the federal navigation and shipping head of power.29 It encompasses a
number of non-exhaustive factors, including: the spatial, functional and temporal
relationship between the maritime and the non-maritime elements of the matter at
issue; the context surrounding the relationship of the parties; the practical importance of legal uniformity; the fact that the matter implicates norms speciﬁc to the
maritime context; the historical connection to English maritime law; and relevant
precedents.30 Applying these criteria, the majority concluded that “the sale of
marine engine parts intended for use on a commercial vessel” is integrally connected
to maritime law matters. The majority agreed substantially with Mainville J.A.’s
analysis:
It seems to me self-evident that the repair and supply of engine parts to a ship is
intrinsically related to its seaworthiness and therefore directly and integrally
connected to navigation and shipping. Cargo ships need ports to load and unload
and engines to move from port to port. The proposition that the supply of marine
engine parts to carry out repairs to a cargo ship is not integrally connected with
marine activities seems untenable, since such repairs are essential to allow the ship
to operate on water (navigation) and to move goods from port to port to deliver
cargo (shipping).31

The majority concluded that the matter also validly came within the provincial
25

Wärtsilä, at para. 30-31; Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22,
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 26 (S.C.C.).
26

Wärtsilä, at paras. 32-33, 36.

27

Wärtsilä, at para. 123.

28

Wärtsilä, at para. 165.

29

Wärtsilä, at paras. 50-53.

30

Wärtsilä, at para. 56.

31

Wärtsilä, at paras. 59-60, Wärtsilä QCCA, at para. 95 (per Mainville J.A.).
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power over property and civil rights, as the factual situation of the sale of marine
engine parts for use on a commercial vessel presents a “double aspect”.32
Consequently, the matter could validly be regulated through both the federal power
over navigation and shipping and the provincial power over property and civil
rights.
The concurring justices rejected the majority’s application of the integral
connection test to deﬁne the scope of the federal power over navigation and
shipping.33 They concluded that the pith and substance test should be applied as it
would be to any other dispute. In applying the test, they relied on assumptions,
implicit in the Supreme Court’s reasons in Monk34 where the Court examined
contractual provisions to determine whether they related to carriage, that “the sale
of goods, even in a maritime context” is a matter governed by the provincial power
over property and civil rights, and not federal authority over navigation and
shipping.35
(b)

Applicability

Having concluded that the matter presented a double aspect, the majority found
that the CCQ was not shielded from applying to the dispute under the doctrine of
interjurisdictional immunity. While the Court in Canadian Western Bank sought to
limit the use of interjurisdictional immunity, the doctrine was not eliminated.36 Two
conditions must be met for the doctrine to apply: the provision must trench on the
“core” of an exclusive head of power; and its application must “impair” the exercise
of the core of the head of power.37 The majority reiterated the caution in Canadian
Western Bank that
interjurisdictional immunity should generally be limited to situations already
covered by precedents, which means in practice that we will usually not expand the
doctrine to protect the core of legislative powers that have not already been so
deﬁned in our jurisprudence.38

In concluding that there was no precedent indicating that the contractual claims
raised in this case comprised part of the core of the federal power over navigation
and shipping, the majority differentiated between the narrow “core” of the federal
32

Wärtsilä, at paras. 82-85.

33

Wärtsilä, at paras. 130, 142.

34

Monk Corp. v. Island Fertilizers Ltd., [1991] S.C.J. No. 28, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 779
(S.C.C.).
35

Wärtsilä, at paras. 170-72, 179.

36

See Wärtsilä, at para. 90; Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22,
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 33-34 (S.C.C.).
37

Wärtsilä, at para. 92.

38

Wärtsilä, at para. 93; Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007]
2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 77-78 (S.C.C.).
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power and its broader scope. The majority distinguished cases, such as Wire Rope,39
that had found similar matters to be sufficiently connected to navigation and
shipping to validly engage the rules of Canadian maritime law. They concluded that,
while the “integral connection” test that had been applied in such cases appropriately deﬁned the scope of the federal power over navigation and shipping, such
precedents could not be relied on to deﬁne its narrower core.40
The majority also concluded that the holding in Ordon Estate41 that maritime
negligence falls within the core of the federal power over navigation and shipping
was not a relevant precedent. The critical difference, for the majority, was that the
need for uniformity in maritime negligence matters is not present in contractual
matters, because in contract the parties are free to choose the law governing the
contract.42
Having concluded that the application of the CCQ did not trench on the core of
the federal power over navigation and shipping, it was not necessary for the majority
to consider whether the core was “impaired” under the second stage of the test.
The concurrence did not consider interjurisdictional immunity, but commented on
the dangers of attempting to deﬁne a core of broad and general federal powers, and
the resulting uncertainty where provincial laws may affect matters within the core
of federal jurisdiction but will be inapplicable should they impair that core.43
Acknowledging that this leaves “an exceedingly limited role in the division of
powers analysis”,44 the concurring justices’ preference would have been to resolve
disputes under pith and substance instead of resorting to interjurisdictional immunity.45
(c)

Operability

The majority concluded that the relevant provisions of the CCQ were not
rendered inoperable through the doctrine of federal paramountcy. In doing so, the
majority conﬁrmed the suggestion in Ryan Estate that the doctrine of federal
paramountcy “does not apply to an inconsistency between the common law and a
39

Wire Rope Industries of Canada (1966) Ltd. v. B.C. Marine Shipbuilders Ltd., [1981]
S.C.J. No. 34, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 363, at 377, 379 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Wire Rope”].
40

Wärtsilä, at paras. 94-95; see also British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge
Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86, at para. 42 (S.C.C.).
41

See also Marine Services International Ltd. v. Ryan Estate, [2013] S.C.J. No. 44,
[2013] 3 S.C.R. 53, at para. 53 (S.C.C.).
42

Wärtsilä, at para. 97.

43

Wärtsilä, at paras. 157-158, 160.

44

Wärtsilä, at para. 155.

45

Wärtsilä, at para. 161.
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valid legislative enactment”.46 Similarly, the non-statutory rules of Canadian
maritime law cannot be paramount to provincial legislation.47 Neither English
legislation enacted at a time when it still applied to Canadian maritime law, nor the
grant of jurisdiction under the Federal Courts Act, affected this conclusion.48 The
concurrence, having resolved the matter under the pith and substance test, did not
address federal paramountcy.
Not being rendered inapplicable under interjurisdictional immunity, nor inoperable under paramountcy, the CCQ governed the outcome of the dispute and the trial
judge’s award of damages was restored.
IV. ANALYSIS
1.

Pith and Substance

(a)

Notice of Constitutional Question

The Court’s majority and concurring reasons differ chieﬂy over the question of
vires: whether the matter involving TDI’s claim regarding the failed marine engine
equipment falls within exclusive federal jurisdiction over navigation and shipping,
exclusive provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights, or exhibits a double
aspect falling under both. The majority reasons emphasize the breadth of federal
maritime law, characterizing it as “a seamless web” extending into private law and
encompassing non-statutory common law principles, while the concurring reasons
would limit Parliament’s power as not extending into contracts for the sale of goods,
even when they arise in the maritime context.
Interestingly, the Notice of Constitutional Question served by the appellants to the
Attorneys General of Canada and of each of the provinces did not raise any question
as to pith and substance, on which the majority and concurrence split. The Notice
posed the following two questions:
1.

Are articles 1729 and 1733 of the Québec Civil Code constitutionally
inoperative in respect of a claim by a buyer for damages arising from a
latent defect pursuant to a contract of sale of a marine engine or equipment
supplied to a ship by reason of the doctrine of federal paramountcy?

2.

Are articles 1729 and 1733 of the Québec Civil Code constitutionally
inapplicable in respect of a claim by a buyer for damages arising from a
latent defect pursuant to a contract of sale of a marine engine or equipment
supplied to a ship by reason of the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity?49

46
Marine Services International Ltd. v. Ryan Estate, [2013] S.C.J. No. 44, [2013] 3
S.C.R. 53, at para. 66 (S.C.C.).
47

Wärtsilä, at para. 101.

48

Wärtsilä, at paras. 103-105.

49

Factum of the Appellant, Transport Desgagnés Inc. et al. v. Wärtsilä Canada Inc. et al.,
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The Attorneys General of Ontario and Quebec intervened with respect to the
constitutional question, while the Attorney General of Canada did not.
The Court has in previous cases emphasized the importance of notice to the
Attorneys General of Canada and of the provinces.50 Neither the majority nor
concurring reasons in Wärtsilä, however, address the issue of notice, notwithstanding that the three concurring justices were prepared to rule that Parliament’s
legislative authority over navigation and shipping does not extend to contracts for
the sale of goods, even in a maritime context. While no federal law’s validity was
at issue, the concurrence would prospectively impose constitutional parameters on
federal authority to legislate in relation to such matters. This signals to attorneys
general considering intervention on constitutional questions that the court sees
federalism issues holistically; i.e., where federalism issues are raised, pith and
substance, applicability and operability are interrelated analyses that may all be
addressed, even if they are not each expressly identiﬁed in the Notice of
Constitutional Question.
(b)

The Canadian Western Bank Trajectory

Both the majority and concurrence rely on the jurisprudential trajectory favouring
ﬂexible federalism following Canadian Western Bank but reach markedly different
outcomes. Both emphasize the desirability of ﬂexible federalism and role for the two
orders of government in areas of overlapping jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding these similar overtures, the concurrence rejected the majority’s
recourse to the double aspect doctrine, which had necessitated consideration of
interjurisdictional immunity and paramountcy. The concurrence rejected reliance on
interjurisdictional immunity as a “mere undertow” of federalism analysis, preferring
to resolve dispute through the “dominant tide” that is the pith and substance
analysis.51
In this respect, the concurrence’s analysis is in friction with Canadian Western
Bank and the dominant trend in subsequent cases that emphasize the role of the
double aspect doctrine, which recognizes that both Parliament and the provincial
legislatures can adopt valid legislation on a single subject, ensuring that the policies
of the elected legislators of both levels of government are respected.52 The
concurrence’s reasoning instead ﬁnds parallels in the Court’s few post-Canadian
Western Bank judgments to hold laws ultra vires.53 For instance, federal power over
Supreme Court of Canada File No. 37873, Appendix, at 43.
50

Guindon v. Canada, [2015] S.C.J. No. 41, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para. 23 (per Rothstein
and Cromwell JJ.) and at para. 114 (per Abella and Wagner JJ., concurring, dissenting on
whether to decide the constitutional issue) (S.C.C.).
51

Wärtsilä, at para. 156 (per Wagner C.J.C. and Brown J.).

52

Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para.
30 (S.C.C.).
53

Notably, following Wärtsilä, Wagner C.J.C., Brown and Rowe JJ., concur with Kasirer
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trade and commerce does not include double aspect authority over day-to-day
regulation of contracts, public protection and professional competence.54 Provincial
authority over property and civil rights and matters of a merely local or private
nature likewise does not encompass a double aspect in respect of the choice of
location of radiocommunication antennae55 or the regulation of possession of
property that poses an existential threat to a federal interprovincial pipeline
undertaking.56
The Court has previously indicated that an approach favouring the role of the
double aspect doctrine is preferred in part because it avoids the risk of regulatory
vacuums caused by excessive reliance on watertight spheres of provincial and
federal competence57 or on excessive expansion of the doctrine of interjurisdictional
immunity.58 By positing that Parliament cannot make laws in relation to the sale of
goods even in the maritime context, the concurrence raises the potential for a
provincial silo of authority over certain areas of property and civil rights, limiting
any federal regulation to aspects other than contractual dealings. Quaere whether
such an approach could itself result in regulatory vacuums over matters uniquely
amenable to federal regulation, including but not limited to navigation and shipping.
(c)

Integral Connection

The divergent approaches to ﬂexible federalism and the pith and substance test
were also apparent in how the majority and the concurrence understood the role of
non-statutory Canadian maritime law. For the majority, where navigation and
shipping is concerned, particularly in cases involving non-statutory Canadian
maritime law, the pith and substance analysis must address whether the maritime
elements of the matter render it integrally connected to the federal navigation and
shipping power. The majority’s analytical framework is drawn from previous
jurisprudence relying on the test for establishing the Federal Court of Canada’s
maritime law jurisdiction pursuant to the deﬁnition of maritime law in section 22 of
the Federal Court Act.
J.’s dissenting reasons that would follow a similar analysis to ﬁnd the federal Genetic
Non-Discrimination Act, S.C. 2017, c. 3, ultra vires (Reference re Genetic NonDiscrimination Act, [2020] S.C.J. No. 17, 2020 SCC 17 at paras. 254, 263, 271-272 (S.C.C.)).
54
Reference re Securities Act, [2011] S.C.J. No. 66, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 837, at para. 122
(S.C.C.).
55

Rogers Communications Inc. v. Châteauguay (City), [2016] S.C.J. No. 23, [2016] 1
S.C.R. 467, at paras. 50-52 (S.C.C.).
56

Reference re Environmental Management Act (British Columbia), [2020] S.C.J. No. 1,
2020 SCC 1 (S.C.C.), affg [2019] B.C.J. No. 925, 2019 BCCA 181, at paras. 97-101
(B.C.C.A.).
57

British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 23,
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 86, at para. 4 (S.C.C.).
58

Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44,
[2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, at para. 69 (S.C.C.).
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By contrast, the concurrence rejects the majority’s reliance on the integral
connection test and departs from previous jurisprudence concerning the navigation
and shipping head of power to posit that the federalism analysis should not afford
special treatment for maritime law. Instead, the pith and substance test should
simply ask whether a matter comes within navigation and shipping within the
meaning of section 91(10) of the Constitution Act, 1867, just as with any other head
of power. As the concurrence observes, the ordinary approach to the pith and
substance analysis focuses on ﬁrst characterizing the “law or provision in question”,
and, second, assigning it to a head of power. The concurrence accepts that in a case
where no law was challenged, it would be appropriate to characterize the “claim”
and assign it to a head of power.59
The majority, however, maintains the unique approach of the “integral connection” test. The majority opts, at the ﬁrst stage of the pith and substance analysis, to
characterize the matter by looking at the “substantive body of law at issue and to the
particular fact situation”, assessed on a case-by-case basis.60 The majority appears
to be of the view that the focus on federal non-statutory law demanded this unique
approach to the pith and substance analysis.61
Maritime law matters are indeed unique. In most areas of federal jurisdiction,
such as banking, bankruptcy, or trade and commerce, provincial private law informs
the interpretation of valid federal legislation.62 Maritime law, however, is laded with
federal non-statutory law that draws on both common law and civilian sources.63
Adopting a more casuistic approach to assessing the pith and substance of maritime
law matters may foster the development of federal non-statutory maritime law, while
maintaining its distinctiveness from provincial private law. Nor is the “integral
connection” test entirely unique to navigation and shipping in federalism jurisprudence: the Supreme Court has adopted a similarly fact-driven approach to assessing
whether employment, ordinarily subject to provincial regulation, is sufficiently
“integral” to a federal undertaking to be federally regulated through “derivative
jurisdiction”.64
59

Wärtsilä, at paras. 122-124.

60

Wärtsilä, at para. 33.

61

Wärtsilä, at para. 32.
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See Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, s. 8.1; Re Griffen, [1998] S.C.J. No. 11,
[1998] 1 S.C.R. 91, at para. 64 (S.C.C.); Peoples Department Store Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise,
[2004] S.C.J. No. 64, 2004 SCC 68, at para. 29 (S.C.C.); Bank of Montreal v. Innovation
Credit Union, [2010] S.C.J. No. 47, 2010 SCC 47, at paras. 31-32 (S.C.C.).
63

Wärtsilä, at para. 19; Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437,
at para. 71 (S.C.C.).
64

See Tessier Ltée v. Quebec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail), [2012]
S.C.J. No. 23, 2012 SCC 23, at para. 18 (S.C.C.) and Consolidated Fastfrate Inc. v. Western
Canada Council of Teamsters, [2009] S.C.J. No. 53, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 407, at paras. 28, 75
(S.C.C.).
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A further tension between the majority and concurrence is the signiﬁcance of
uniformity in federal maritime law. The majority’s analysis emphasizes that one
factor that must be considered is the desirability of achieving uniformity between
jurisdictions in maritime law matters, which will tend to indicate that Parliament has
jurisdiction to legislate.65 By contrast, the concurrence dismisses not only the
integral connection test as a whole but also the relevance of uniformity. Speciﬁcally,
the concurrence acknowledges the importance of uniform treatment of matters
falling within a federal head of power such as navigation and shipping but
emphasizes that uniformity cannot drive the determination of whether a matter falls
within navigation and shipping.66
The majority’s approach represents a retention of elements of the pre-Canadian
Western Bank federalism jurisdiction involving maritime law.67 These cases adopted
the integral connection analysis used to determine whether the Federal Court of
Canada’s maritime law jurisdiction applied to a particular dispute.68 The majority
modiﬁes this test to determine whether federal maritime law validly extends to the
matter in Wärtsilä, but then applies Canadian Western Bank and subsequent
jurisprudence to determine whether the valid provincial law is inapplicable or
inoperative.
The concurrence prefers a clean break from pre-Canadian Western Bank maritime
law federalism jurisprudence, opting to characterize and classify the matter without
further exploration of its potential connection to maritime law. The concurrence
emphasizes that section 22 of the Federal Courts Act “does not, and cannot, deﬁne
the scope of Parliament’s legislative authority over navigation and shipping. It is
merely a statutory grant of jurisdiction by Parliament to the Federal Court.”69
This dialogue on the continued relevance of the integral connection test to
65

Wärtsilä, at paras. 23, 55; Whitbread v. Walley, [1990] S.C.J. No. 138, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
1273, at 1295-1297 (S.C.C.); Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding
Ltd., [1997] S.C.J. No. 111, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1210, at para. 88 (S.C.C.); Ordon Estate v. Grail,
[1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437, at paras. 71, 79 (S.C.C.); Isen v. Simms, [2006]
S.C.J. No. 41, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 349, at para. 28 (S.C.C.).
66

Wärtsilä, at paras. 150-153 (per Wagner C.J.C. and Brown J.).

67

Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437, at paras. 1, 73
(S.C.C.); Whitbread v. Walley, [1990] S.C.J. No. 138, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1273 (S.C.C.); Monk
Corp. v. Island Fertilizers Ltd., [1991] S.C.J. No. 28, [1991] 1 S.C.R. 779, at para. 111
(S.C.C.); Bow Valley Husky (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Saint John Shipbuilding Ltd., [1997] S.C.J. No.
111, [1997] 3 S.C.R., at paras. 84-86 (S.C.C.); Isen v. Simms, [2006] S.C.J. No. 41, [2006]
2 S.C.R. 349, at para. 28 (S.C.C.); British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada
Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86, at para. 66 (S.C.C.).
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See Wire Rope Industries of Canada (1966) Ltd. v. B.C. Marine Shipbuilders Ltd.,
[1981] S.C.J. No. 34, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 363 (S.C.C.); ITO - International Terminal Operators
Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc., [1986] S.C.J. No. 38, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752, at para. 20 (S.C.C.).
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Wärtsilä, at para. 131 (per Wagner C.J.C. and Brown J.).
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ascertaining federal legislative authority over navigation and shipping, and the
development federal non-statutory maritime law, may well be the subject of
continued consideration in future cases.
2.

Applicability

Having found that the sale of marine engine parts in this case exhibited a double
aspect, the majority proceeded to inquire whether the provincial law was inapplicable. In doing so, it would have required the provincial law to impair, rather than
affect, the core of the federal authority over navigation and shipping to exclude the
application of provincial law. The concurrence, having resolved the dispute at the
pith and substance stage, found it unnecessary to consider interjurisdictional
immunity or paramountcy.
(a)

Interjurisdictional Immunity Is in General Limited by Precedent

The majority’s reasons on interjurisdictional immunity extends the Court’s
generally consistent treatment of the subject since Canadian Western Bank.70 The
majority conﬁrmed that interjurisdictional immunity is of limited application and
should in general be reserved for situations already covered by precedent.71
Applying this reasoning, the majority observed that there is no precedent for
recognizing contracts for the sale of marine engine parts as coming within the core
of federal authority over navigation and shipping.
Despite ﬁnding no precedent, however, the majority went on to consider
arguments for including the sale of marine engine parts within the core of navigation
and shipping. The majority dismissed arguments in favour of expanding the core of
navigation and shipping based on the need for uniformity in maritime law, pointing
out that these concerns do not apply in cases of contract where the parties are at
liberty to choose the law governing the contract. Moreover, the majority concluded
that the integral connection test, relevant to pith and substance, was not a basis for
ﬁnding the core of navigation and shipping to be engaged because integral
connection and core are separate concepts: the former deﬁnes the breadth of the
scope of maritime law, while the latter is conﬁned to the “basic, minimum and
unassailable content” that is “absolutely indispensable or necessary; extremely
70

See Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn., [2010] S.C.J.
No. 39, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 536, at para. 26 (S.C.C.) and, in the maritime law context, Marine
Services International Ltd. v. Ryan Estate, [2013] S.C.J. No. 44, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 53, at paras.
50, 64 (S.C.C.).
71
Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No. 39,
[2010] 2 S.C.R. 536, at para. 25 (S.C.C.); Marine Services International Ltd. v. Ryan Estate,
[2013] S.C.J. No. 44, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 53, at para. 51 (S.C.C.); Rogers Communications Inc.
v. Châteauguay (City), [2015] S.C.J. No. 23, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 467, at para. 63 (S.C.C.);
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011]
3 S.C.R. 134, at paras. 60-70 (S.C.C.).
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important, crucial” to make the power effective for the purpose for which it was
conferred.72
The Court’s consistent qualiﬁcation that the restriction of the core of heads of
legislative authority to matters covered by precedent applies “in general” arguably
leaves the door open to the future recognition of new core matters. This
interpretation is suggested by the statements of the Quebec Court of Appeal’s
decision in IMTT-Québec Inc. that while, “‘in principle,’ the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity is of limited application, it has not been removed from the
analysis of Canadian federalism”.73 While the Supreme Court indeed has not closed
the door to the possibility of recognizing new “core” matters, its post-Canadian
Western Bank emphasis on limiting the use of interjurisdictional immunity suggests
such a development is unlikely. The Court’s continued unwillingness since Canadian Western Bank to recognize any new “core” matters not established by
precedent,74 alongside its consistent cautioning against reliance on interjurisdictional immunity, weighs signiﬁcantly against expansion into new “core” matters.
Moreover, the three concurring justices’ express preparedness to leave interjurisdictional immunity with an “exceedingly limited role” in federalism analysis
suggests the tendency leans toward further toward restriction rather than expansion
of the interjurisdictional immunity doctrine.
(b) Conﬁrmed Application of the Modern Approach to Interjurisdictional
Immunity in Maritime Law
The majority reasons in Wärtsilä remove any uncertainty as to whether the
restrained approach to interjurisdictional immunity following Canadian Western
Bank applies in the maritime law context. While this might seem uncontroversial,
72
Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras.
40, 50-51 (S.C.C.).
73

Quebec (Attorney General) v. IMTT-Québec Inc., [2019] Q.J. No. 8257, 2019 QCCA
1598, at paras. 91-94 (Que. C.A.) [footnotes omitted], leave to appeal refused [2019]
S.C.C.A. No. 422 (S.C.C.); see also Jean Lortie et al., “Trio of Recent Supreme Court of
Canada Decisions Signals Provinces Cannot Impede Federal Undertakings under the Guise of
Environmental Protection” McCarthy Tétrault (April 22, 2020), online: <https://www.mccarthy.
ca/en/insights/blogs/canadian-appeals-monitor/trio-recent-supreme-court-canada-decisionssignals-provinces-cannot-impede-federal-undertakings-under-guise-environmental-protection>.
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Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canadian Owners and Pilots Assn., [2010] S.C.J. No. 39,
[2010] 2 S.C.R. 536, at para. 37 (S.C.C.); Rogers Communications Inc. v. Châteauguay
(City), [2015] S.C.J. No. 23, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 467, at paras. 63-69 (S.C.C.); Canada (Attorney
General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134, at
paras. 67-70 (S.C.C.); Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] S.C.J. No. 5, [2015] 1
S.C.R. 331, at para. 53 (S.C.C.); Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44,
[2014] 2 S.C.R. 257, at para. 151 (S.C.C.); see also Bank of Montreal v. Marcotte, [2014]
S.C.J. No. 55, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 725, at paras. 62-69 (S.C.C.).
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provincial appellate courts in Wärtsilä and Ryan Estate continued to apply
pre-Canadian Western Bank precedents such as Wire Rope, Ordon Estate and Bow
Valley Husky to oust the application of provincial law. The majority agreed with the
submission of the Attorney General of Ontario that “[w]hat is ‘integral’ does not
equate to what is ‘core’” and reiterated the caution in Lafarge that “[w]hat is ‘vital’
or ‘essential’ is, by deﬁnition, not co-extensive with every element of an undertaking
incorporated federally or subject to federal regulation”.75 Only those elements that
are “absolutely indispensable or necessary” to a federal undertaking’s discharge of
its responsibilities engage the protection of interjurisdictional immunity.76 As a
result, the majority concluded that notwithstanding there being an integral connection to navigation and shipping, regulation of the contract for the sale of marine
engine parts is not indispensable or necessary to the federal authority.
The majority’s distinction between what is essential to federal authority over
navigation and shipping and the broader scope of the federal power will require
nuanced treatment of pre-Canadian Western Bank maritime law precedents that do
not consider this distinction. Cases such as Wire Rope and ITO77 addressed the
Federal Court of Canada’s maritime law jurisdiction by asking whether there was a
sufficient integral connection to the matter before the court. Earlier federalism cases
such as Ordon Estate and Bow Valley Husky78 adopted the integral connection
analysis to determine whether a matter falls within federal jurisdiction over
navigation and shipping and excluded the application of provincial laws where this
was the case. The majority in Wärtsilä affirms the application of the integral
connection analysis at the pith and substance stage of the federalism analysis.
However, the majority reasons, along with the Court’s reasons in Ryan Estate,
overtake the above pre-Canadian Western Bank precedents as a basis for ousting the
application of provincial laws, requiring instead that the more stringent modern
requirements of interjurisdictional immunity be met.
(c)

Contracts and the Core of Navigation and Shipping

The majority concludes that there was no precedent for including the sale of
75
Wärtsilä, at para. 95; Factum of the Intervener Attorney General of Ontario, Transport
Desgagnés Inc. et al. v. Wärtsilä Canada Inc. et al., Supreme Court of Canada File No.
37873, at para. 19; British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007]
S.C.J. No. 23, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 86, at para. 42 (S.C.C.). See also Isen v. Simms, [2006] S.C.J.
No. 41, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 349, at paras. 23-28 (S.C.C.); Bell Canada v. Québec (Commission
de santé et de la sécurité du travail du Québec), [1988] S.C.J. No. 41, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 749,
at 839, 859-60 (S.C.C.); Canadian Western Bank v. Alberta, [2007] S.C.J. No. 22, [2007] 2
S.C.R. 3, at paras. 51-53 (S.C.C.).
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See British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Lafarge Canada Inc., [2007] S.C.J. No. 23,
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 86, at para. 43 (S.C.C.).
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ITO - International Terminal Operators Ltd. v. Miida Electronics Inc., [1986] S.C.J.
No. 38, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 752 (S.C.C.).
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Wärtsilä, at para. 32.
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marine engine parts as falling within the core of federal authority over navigation
and shipping because the relevant precedents only concern maritime negligence, not
contracts. However, the action for damages at issue was not merely for reimbursement of the cost of defective engine parts but for over $5.6 million in damages
resulting from the engine parts’ failure. The claim is at least arguably analogous to
other negligence cases involving contracts, such as the damages arising from the
negligent installation of the heat trace system in Bow Valley Husky. Canadian law
has long recognized that damages arising from contractual relationships are not
limited to breach of contract but can include damages for negligence more in the
nature of tort.79
The distinction between Wärtsilä and other cases involving damages arising due
to the failure of marine vessel equipment may be more subtle than the majority’s
reasons suggest. Wärtsilä involved the sale of engine parts, with the maritime
context being their use on a commercial marine vessel, circumstances generally
removed from the body of maritime laws relating to matters such as navigation,
good seamanship, or the movement of goods on and off a ship associated with
navigation and shipping. This distinction was observed by the trial judge:
[T]he contract for the sale of a marine engine is not integrally connected, for
instance, to issues of safe carriage of goods over the sea, movement of goods on and
off a ship (shipping), seaworthiness of a ship or good seamanship (navigation). It
is also not integrally connected to applicable admiralty law, rules, principles or
practices or international maritime conventions.
Moreover, there is no practical necessity for uniform federal law to prescribe, for
instance, the rules governing the seller’s obligations to provide warranty regarding
the quality of the product sold. The fact that such rules may vary depending on the
applicable provincial law of contracts does not hinder the effıcient and coherent
conduct of the activities of navigation and shipping.80

While many of the precedents pre-date Canadian Western Bank and do not
employ the impairment test for interjurisdictional immunity, their attention to where
maritime matters demand a need for uniformity remains instructive. For instance, in
Ordon Estate, the desired uniformity in maritime negligence law is described as
relating to “the standard, elements, and terms of liability for negligence between
vessels or those responsible for vessels” and the “specialized rules and principles of
admiralty law deal with negligence on the waters in a unique manner, focusing on
concerns of ‘good seamanship’ and other peculiarly maritime issues”.81 Similarly, in
79
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Bow Valley Husky, the allegations included that the defendants knew about “special
marine material requirements such as non-combustibility or ﬂame retardancy” of the
failed heat trace system that caused their product liability claims to be “clearly
dominated by marine considerations”.82
By contrast, the majority’s reasons addressing pith and substance indicate an
absence of the concern for uniformity in maritime matters found in the reasons of
Ordon Estate and Bow Valley Husky. Unlike negligence, the “nature and circumstances of the contractual breach are not determinative” and “the fact that the
defective engine part failed on the open water is of little import”.83 Rather, the terms
of contracts are speciﬁc to the parties who must be able to determine the governing
law at the point of negotiation.84 This focus on the substance of the contract between
the parties suggests that the subject matter of the contract may bear on whether
precedent exists for including the matter within the core of navigation and shipping.
It remains to be seen whether future claims involving contracts will be routinely
treated as falling outside the core of navigation and shipping, or if the Court will
consider whether the substance of a particular contract comes within the scope of
precedents recognizing the need for uniformity in maritime law, potentially
engaging the core of federal authority over navigation and shipping.
(d) Impairment
Having concluded that the sale of marine engine parts at issue did not fall within
the core of federal jurisdiction over navigation and shipping, the majority did not
consider impairment. The majority and concurrence both emphasized, however, that
Ryan Estate makes clear that where a matter is found to fall within the protected core
of navigation and shipping, the analysis must then consider “impairment” before the
provincial law is rendered constitutionally inapplicable. This conﬁrms that Ordon
Estate is no longer a valid precedent for interjurisdictional immunity as it does not
address the notion of impairment of the federal core.85
3.
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The majority’s reasons conﬁrm that otherwise validly applicable provincial
legislation cannot be displaced by federal non-statutory law. This principle was
stated in obiter and without elaboration in Ryan Estate. The Court’s reasons
emphasize that the concern of the federal paramountcy doctrine is with displacement
of Parliament’s legislative intent, whether by operational conﬂict or frustration of
purpose. This is distinct from interjurisdictional immunity, which is concerned with
the content of the exclusive federal authority, rather than the legislative exercise of
that power.86 As such, the decision provides a measure of certainty for the limited
circumstances where otherwise valid and applicable provincial laws come into
conﬂict with legal principles that could form part of a body of federal non-statutory
law.
V. CONCLUSION
The majority and concurring minority reasons regarding the pith and substance
analysis exhibit difference on the continued role for pre-Canadian Western Bank
precedents such as Ordon Estate and Bow Valley Husky that apply the integral
connection test, including the need for uniformity to inform the content of federal
maritime law. The concurring justices would do away with this approach, opting
instead to assign the matter of the contract to either federal or provincial
competence, while the majority allows for a continuing role for the previous
jurisprudence in informing the scope of navigation and shipping, but not for
excluding the application of overlapping provincial laws.
The majority reasons on interjurisdictional immunity, together with Ryan Estate,
overrides the precedential authority of Ordon Estate and Bow Valley Husky for
ousting the application of provincial laws. It further continues the Court’s pattern
since Canadian Western Bank of limiting the core of constitutional heads of
legislative authority protected by interjurisdictional immunity to matters already
established by precedent, and conﬁrms that this core must be impaired, not merely
affected, before the doctrine will render laws inapplicable. Finally, the majority
conﬁrms that federal non-statutory maritime law is insufficient to render provincial
legislation inoperative, which requires conﬂict with Parliament’s legislative intent.
The fault lines between the majority and concurring minority reasons suggest
continued dialogue over the integral connection test’s role in determining the scope
of federal jurisdiction over navigation and shipping, as resolution is sought between
the desire for uniformity in matters properly falling within navigation and shipping
and a consistent approach to pith and substance irrespective of the particular head
of power. The majority reasons further indicate a consensus that the limited role of
interjurisdictional immunity in federalism analysis extends to navigation and
shipping, while the Court’s thinking on the signiﬁcance of contract-based claims
could be an area of future development.
3 S.C.R. 53, at para. 64 (S.C.C.); Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] S.C.J. No. 84, [1998] 3 S.C.R.
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